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A Comparison of Wage Détermination 




This study compares the methods that are used to dé-
termine wages in the developing and developed countries 
of the Americas. 
The wage earners' standards of living dépend to a great extent 
on the methods by which their wages are determined. Such methods 
can affect wage levels and differentials as well as the overall share of 
wage earners in income distribution and the fruits of development. 
This study compares the methods that are used to détermine wages 
in the developing and developed 
countries of the Americas. The 
most important methods that 
can be identified include the 
government régulation of mini-
mum wages and wage adjust-
ments, collective bargaining and 
payment by results. 
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN WAGE DETERMINATION 
Ail countries of the Americas hâve passed législation which 
spécifies some type of statutory minimum wages. However, there is a 
wide variation in the stated objectives of such législation. Some ex-
amples of the explicit objectives of minimum wage législation include 
the following : l 
• to guarantee that every employée receives a wage which 
provides a certain basic income and standard of living (Canada 
and the United States). 
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• to obtain for the employée a «fair share» of national income 
and «fair participation» in the results of économie growth 
(Argentina and Costa Rica). 
• to provide a basis for the expansion of production and employ-
ment by increasing demand (Argentina, Brazil, Peru). 
• to increase the productivity of employées by increasing their 
standard of living, health, and satisfaction (Colombia, Brazil 
and Peru). 
• to serve as a transitional alternative until a more comprehensive 
form of wage régulation is developed (Mexico, Uruguay, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago). 
Despite the apparent universality of thèse stated objectives, there 
are still a great number of wage earners in each country who do not 
receive the minimum wages which hâve been set by law. Such laws 
frequently exclude certain occupational groups such as domestic 
servants and public employées. Also, minimum wage laws are easily 
evaded in particular sectors of the economy (such as the handicraft, 
retailing, small factory, small service and agricultural industries) and in 
particular geographical locations (particularly in countrysides, small 
towns, and the outskirts of large cities).2 
At least three types of minimum wage regulating agencies can be 
distinguished within the Americas. The first type involves the establish-
ment of minimum wage decrees by Government. In Cuba, the Ministry 
of Labour fixes the minimum wage after consultation with workers' 
représentatives. In Canada, minimum wages which apply to workers 
under the fédéral jurisdiction (which covers approximately 10% of ail 
Canadian workers) are set by statute and administered directly by the 
Minister of Labour. 
In the United States, fédéral minimum wages are established by 
the Fair Labour Standards Act which can be amended by a vote of 
Congress. Also, the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act provides that 
employées working on ail government let contract work exceeding 
$10,000 be paid not less than the prevailing minimum wages as establish-
ed by the Secretary of Labour. Thèse prevailing minimums for gov-
ernment work are determined for about thirty industries on the basis 
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of wage surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labour Statistics.3 In 
addition, many state and local governments also hâve minimum wage 
laws. 
A second type of minimum wage regulating mechanism consists of 
a tripartite body responsible for recommending minimum wage rates to 
some législative body. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands both hâve 
tripartite industry committees to recommend minimum hourly wage 
rates. 
A third variant of minimum wage regulating mechanisms involves 
a tripartite body responsible for fixing minimum wage rates. Each 
Canadian province has a single wage board presided over by a gov-
ernment officiai. Thèse boards issue gênerai orders which set rates 
applicable to the majority of workers and spécial orders which set 
higher rates for particular industries or occupations.4 In Argentina, a 
single national minimum wage is determined by law and automatically 
adjusted for changes in the cost-of-living index by a décision of the 
National Minimum Wage-Fixing Council. 
The gênerai system in Uruguay is of somewhat spécial interest. 
Minimum wages are fixed by boards which consist of three government 
members, two workers' members and two employers' members., Thèse 
boards are set up for various occupational groupings in a given geo-
graphical area and may be established on the initiative of the Govern-
ment or upon the request of either party. The décisions of the boards 
on minimum wages applicable to each kind of work within their jurisdic-
tion may be contested by the Government (if the minimum wages are 
considered too low) or the affected parties (unless the décision of the 
board is unanimous). 
Régulations providing for the establishment of minimum wage 
boards hâve also been set up in Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
According to the International Labour Organization, the principles 
utilized by tripartite boards to arrive at minimum wage rates hâve much 
in common throughout the Americas. Usually, thèse boards consider 
such factors as gênerai économie conditions and cost of living considéra-
tions. In some countries (particularly Mexico, Peru, Brazil and Colom-
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bia) spécial attention is given to market conditions which affect the 
ability of an industry to absorb a particular minimum wage.5 
The enactment of minimum wage législation by no means guar-
antees its effective implementation. Many difficultés are involved in 
implementing the législation within the existing économie and social 
institutions. The inadéquate éducation of some workers makes it difficult 
to inform them of their rights under the minimum wage laws. Frequent-
ly, insufficient resources are devoted to publieizing and enforcing such 
laws. And inevitably, there will be a certain proportion of workers who 
may be so anxious to obtain and retain jobs that are in scarce supply 
that they voluntarily refuse to demand the application of minimum 
wage laws. Such problems are by no means unique to the develop-
ing countries. Both Canada and the United States still hâve some 
occupations, industries and régions where thèse problems are extemely 
prévalent. 
There is a gênerai tendency in some countries for légal minimum 
to be set so low as to hâve an insignificant effect on gênerai wage 
levels. In other words, «the minimum level below which wages may 
not legally fall is frequently just at — or — just above — what the 
lowest paid workers would receive in any case, if there had been no 
law ».6 
In most countries of the Americas, régulations not only influence 
minimum wages, but certain permissible wage adjustments as well. 
When a firm opérâtes in an environment where it is not exposed 
to compétition from other employers, the Government may find it 
necessary to intervene on the workers' behalf. In most of Central 
America governments represent workers in wage negotiations where 
company wages are fixed. In Costa Rica, contracts in force with the 
banana and cocoa plantations stipulate that the lowest wage should be 
50 per cent higher than the statutory minimum applicable on coffee 
plantations (which are not usually foreign owned). In Argentina, the 
National Rural Employment Board advises the National Minimum Wage 
Board on wages for seasonal workers.7 
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Irdividuals employed either directly or indirectly by government 
departments, government enterprises, or government subsidized «pri-
vate» companies may constitute anywhere from 15 to 35 per cent of a 
country's total non-agricultural labour force. Most public employées in 
the Americas hâve few, if any, collective bargaining rights and are 
dépendent upon the whims of government for wage adjustments. In 
récent years, public employées in the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico hâve been struggling to improve their bargaining rights and it 
is likely that this pattern will spread to the more developed countries 
in the Americas in the near future. 
The United States, Canada, and Argentina hâve ail experimented 
with forms of wage guidelines that are somewhat less than compulsory. 
In each case, voluntary adhérence to thèse guidelines was not forth-
coming and it became necessary to drop the guidelines or revert to 
System of outright wage controls. Both Canada and Argentina chose the 
former solution while the United States chose the latter. However, the 
United States experiment with wage controls between 1971 and 1973 
was subsequently abandoned in favor of a return to a System of free 
collective bargaining. 
WAGE DETERMINATION BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Another significant method of wage détermination in the Americas, 
collective bargaining, is somewhat related to the regulatory mechanisms 
previously described. It is not unusual in Latin America for the repré-
sentatives of both employers' and workers' organizations to take an 
active part in the negotiations leading to the adoption and promulgation 
of minimum wage rates by wage boards and government authorities. 
In Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and 
some Canadian jurisdictions, any collective agreement arrived at 
between the parties in a particular industry may hâve its scope extend-
ed by a regulatory agency to cover the whole of the relevant trade or 
industry. 
Except in Argentina and Mexico, the method of collective bargain-
ing in wage détermination has until recently been rather limited in Latin 
America. The rapid pace of industrialization in a number of countries 
has been accompanied by a correspondingly rapid pace of unionization 
activities. Venezuela is a prime example of this trend. Collective bar-
gaining is also gaining ground in the non-Latin countries of the Carib-
A COMPARISON OF WAGE DETERMINATION 117 
bean, especially in the sugar, beverage, and biscuit industries of Tri-
nidad and Tobago and Jamaica.8 
Some interesting différences, however, émerge from a comparison 
of collective bargaining in the United States and Canada with the prac-
tices in other parts of the Americas. 
It has already been mentioned that in many régions of the Amer-
icas, trade unionism is still in its infancy. In thèse régions workers' 
représentatives are often hard pressed to simply insure that minimum 
wage législation is adhered to and at best strive to secure wages that 
are modestly above the minimum wage. Also, attempts are made to 
keep ail wage increases commensurate with minimum wage increases. 
The influence and power of trade unions in much of Latin Amer-
ica hâve to a great extent fluctuated with changes in the political leader-
ship of each country. In many cases, workers' organizations hâve been 
so preoccupied with the fight for their own survival that relatively 
little attention has been paid to achieving acceptable wage adjustments 
for their membership. Thus, a high percentage of unionized workers 
in the Americas still hâve their wages set unilaterally by their employer 
or by régulations of some administrative authorities. 
On the other hand, the relatively stable political environment 
within which Canadian, American and Mexican unions hâve operated 
during the postwar period hâve enabled them to routinize many aspects 
of wage détermination. 
The majority of workers in Canada and the United States hâve 
their wages determined or strongly influenced by the collective bar-
gaining process. Wage bargains that are struck for a particular Com-
pany or industry often hâve far-reaching conséquences for wage dé-
termination in the economy as whole. Settlements achieved in one 
area or industry tend to set patterns throughout the other sectors. Also, 
it is not uncommon for employer s to grant unorganized workers wage 
and salary adjustments that are similar to those achieved by organized 
workers in order to retain valuable employées and to forestall unioniza-
tion. 
However, the collective bargaining Systems of the developed 
countries of the Americas do hâve their shortcomings. In récent years 
the adversary nature of collective bargaining in Canada and the United 
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States has been severely criticized by both scholars and the gênerai 
public. Increasing pressure has been exerted on governments, labour, 
and management to modify the existing process so that industrial con-
flict and its debilitating effects on national productivity play a diminished 
rôle in the wage détermination process. Thus, despite the relatively 
stable environment within which collective bargaining opérâtes in Ca-
nada and the United States, the pressures for more rapid évolution and 
change are becoming stronger. Ultimately, such pressures will hâve 
some influence on the wage détermination Systems of Canada and the 
United States, hopefully for the better. 
WAGE DETERMINATION BY 'PAYMENT FOR RESULTS' 
Employées in the Americas normally are paid for the unit of time 
worked rather than for the results achieved. In fact, the opposition 
to payment by results in Argentina, Peru, and Mexico was evidenced 
by the priority given to the abolition of incentive payment Systems 
in a significant number of collective negotiations.9 
Where «payment for results» Systems are found, they generally 
take the form of a supplément to a basic fixed wage. In Canada and 
the United States, many employées paid on a «commission basis» are 
generally guaranteed a certain minimum level of compensation by their 
employer. In Colombia, suppléments hâve been formulated in terms of 
productivity bonuses (the paint industry) and mileage bonuses (the béer 
delivery workers). In Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela 
législation has been passed that enables workers to share in corporation 
profits. Such législation tends to make profit sharing compulsory rather 
than optional. However, the enforcement and control mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with the législation hâve been extremely weak (espe-
cially in Argentina and Brazil). 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a tendency for outside observers to suggest that wage 
détermination methods within the developing countries of the Americas 
will (and should) mirror the présent methods used within the developed 
countries. Such suggestions fail to fake account of the socio-economic, 
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geographical, and political situations which prevail in the developing 
countries of the Americas. 
The low educational levels of a significant proportion of the work-
ers and the geographical isolation of certain régions and industries 
both contribute substantially to confused and weak collective bargain-
ing institutions. Also, the rapid changes in governments and govern-
mental policies towards collective bargaining stand in the way of any 
rapid development of effective collective bargaining institutions. Thus, 
the wages of a high proportion of workers in the developing areas will 
continue to be determined either by the whims of their employers or 
the decrees of government. 
In this type of environment, the collective actions of workers will 
continue to be directed towards ensuring that public régulations guar-
antee minimum «living» wages to ail employed, that such régulations 
are understood by ail workers, and that such régulations are rigidly 
enforced. 
To accomplish thèse objectives workers' organizations in many 
developing countries of the Americas hâve chosen to become activists 
in the political arena instead of fighting to remove political control and 
interférence from their internai affairs. This tendency has prompted the 
International Labour Organization to conclude in one of its studies 
that «...the central rôle played by the government in fixing wages in 
the private sector and its intervention in industrial relations suggests 
that a différent course of development (in wage détermination) will be 
followed (in the developing countries) from that taken by the United 
States and Canada, where complex, privately-negotiated collective 
agreements hâve become the rule. » 10 
Étude comparative des méthodes de 
fixation des salaires dans les Amériques 
Le niveau de vie des travailleurs dépend pour beaucoup des méthodes de fixation 
des salaires. L'article ci-dessus compare les différentes méthodes de détermination des 
salaires dans les pays industrialisés et en voie de développement dans les deux Amé-
riques. 
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L'auteur étudie en premier lieu le rôle joué par les gouvernements dans la dé-
termination des salaires. Bien que tous les pays des Amériques aient adopté une forme 
quelconque de législation en matière de salaire minimal, les motifs avérés de cette lé-
gislation vont de la garantie d'un revenu de base au Canada et aux États-Unis à un état 
de transition en attendant qu'une forme de contrôle plus étendue des salaires soit établie 
au Mexique, en Uruguay et à la Jamaïque. En outre, le champ d'application de ces lois 
diffère beaucoup d'une nation à l'autre. 
On peut distinguer dans les Amériques trois genres d'organismes chargés du con-
trôle des salaires: l'établissement d'ordonnances de salaire minimal par le gouverne-
ment (l'État fédéral canadien, les États-Unis et Cuba); des organismes tripartites qui 
ont la charge de recommander des taux de salaire minimal à un corps législatif quel-
conque (Puerto Rico et les îles de la Vierge); des commissions qui fixent elles-mêmes 
les tarifs de salaire minimal (la plupart des provinces canadiennes, l'Argentine, l'Uru-
guay, Trinidad et Tobago). 
La rédaction de lois sur le salaire minimal soulève nombre de difficultés. Le 
manque d'instruction d'un certain nombre de travailleurs, l'insuffisance des ressources 
consacrées à la publicité et à l'exécution des lois et le refus des travailleurs d'en exiger 
la mise en vigueur tendent à entraver l'application pratique de la législation tant dans 
les pays industrialisés que dans les États en voie de développement dans les deux 
Amériques. 
Dans la plupart d'entre eux, les règlements étatiques exercent une influence à la 
fois sur les rectifications acceptables des taux de salaire courants que sur les tarifs mini-
maux eux-mêmes. En premier lieu, dans les pays d'Amérique centrale, comme à Costa 
Rina, et en Argentine, les gouvernements sont intervenus de temps en temps au nom 
des travailleurs. De plus, le fait que, à peu près partout, l'État soit directement l'em-
ployeur de 15 à 35 pour cent de l'ensemble de la main-d'œuvre non agricole pèse aussi 
d'un poids considérable sur les ajustements de salaire dans les différentes nations. 
Enfin, un certain nombre de pays, comme les États-Unis, le Canada, l'Argentine et le 
Mexique ont tenté l'expérience de l'établissement de normes directrices ou de contrôles 
en matière de traitements. 
Le deuxième aspect que l'auteur envisage a trait à la détermination des salaires 
par voie de négociation collective. Encore que la négociation collective comme mé-
thode de fixation des salaires soit depuis longtemps courante aux États-Unis, au Ca-
nada, en Argentine et au Mexique, il faut en même temps noter que le rythme de syn-
dicalisation s'est singulièrement accru au cours des dernières années dans les autres 
pays des Amériques. Cependant, le contexte politique à l'intérieur duquel beaucoup de 
syndicats doivent agir demeure très instable dans les nations en voie de développement. 
Le troisième aspect que l'on peut considérer, c'est le salaire payé à la pièce ou 
selon le mérite. La plupart du temps, il revêt la forme d'un supplément qui vient s'ajouter 
au salaire minimal légal. 
Dans sa conclusion, l'Auteur souligne que, dans l'appréciation des méthodesde 
détermination des salaires dans un pays déterminé, il faut tenir compte des conditions 
sociales, économiques, géographiques et politiques qui y prédominent. L'insuffisance 
d'instruction de divers groupes de travailleurs, le degré d'isolement de certaines régions 
et de certaines industries et les changements d'attitude des gouvernements à l'égard de 
la négociation collective ont tendance à avoir un double effet dans les pays en voie de 
développement. 
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Tout d'abord, l'action collective des travailleurs vise à s'orienter vers l'obtention 
d'un salaire minimum vital qui soit garanti, à s'assurer que les travailleurs comprennent 
les réglementations et que ces dernières sont appliquées d'une façon rigoureuse. Deuxiè-
mement, afin d'atteindre ces objectifs, les organisations syndicales sont portées à faire 
de l'activisme politique plutôt qu'à lutter pour écarter la mainmise et l'ingérence des 
partis politiques dans leurs affaires internes. Ainsi, «le rôle primordial joué par le gou-
vernement dans la détermination des salaires dans le secteur privé et son intervention 
dans les relations professionnelles laissent présager une orientation (dans la détermina-
tion des salaires) différente de ce qui existe aux États-Unis et au Canada où des con-
ventions collectives compliquées et négociées privément entre les parties sont devenues 
règle courante». 
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